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Introduction
Mainstream static IO models predicts a fall in prices following an increase in competition irrespective of the price structure. However, in a dynamic framework where rms invest in cost-reducing technologies, a rise in competition may end up increasing price if the dynamic eciency eects outweigh the static ones. In the mobile telecommunications industry, this question is at the center stage of the policy debate regarding whether mergers from four to three mobile operators should be accommodated.
.
In this paper, I take advantage of the entry of the fourth mobile operator in France as well as the merger between the third and the fourth largest mobile operators in Austria to test whether the dynamic eciency eects outweigh the static ones in the mobile telecommunications industry. The empirical test consists in assessing the eect of the entry and the merger on the prices of the mobile telecommunications services. The dynamic eciency eects would dominate the static ones if, contrary to the predictions from the static models, entry induces higher prices and the merger leads to lower prices.
The empirical test relies on a detailed tari dataset provided by Teligen (Strategy Analytics) over 7 quarters and 40 countries. It accounts for the nonlinear structure of the price and the provision of bundles of voice and data services by estimating a hedonic price model (Griliches, 1961) . The design of the hedonic price model assumes that the nonlinear prices observed can be represented by a two-part tari.
Thus it allows us to identify the standalone access and unit prices, as well as their corresponding bundling discounts which are not directly observables from the mobile taris. The estimation of the hedonic price model shows a very good t up to 80 percent.
The identication strategy of the impact of entry and merger relies on a doubledierence approach. Given that the tari of the mobile plans before the entry and the merger were not observed, we employ a nearest-neighbor matching estimation strategy, following Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1998) . The nearest-neighboring markets were identied using a principal component analysis (PCA) based on the determinants of mobile price trend such as the mobile penetration rate, the HerndhalHirschman Index, the number and the average age of the rms in each market before 1 On the one hand, OECD (2014) recommends that increasing the number of mobile network operators would lowers prices and raises investment. On the other hand, Bohlin, Caves, and Eisenach (2013) suggests the contrary. The PCA is implemented on 38 countries for which tari data are available from the Teligen tari database. It yields three factors that represent 80% of the total variance of the variables. Using the coordinates of each country on these three factors, we are able to compute the distance of each market with respect to France and Austria respectively. Based on the minimal distance, we nd that Korea is the closest market to France, whereas Italy is the closest market to Austria.
The double-dierence estimation is implemented on the sample of taris from each pair of markets (France; Korea) and (Austria; Italy). It turns out that neither the entry in France, nor the merger in Austria aects the access price of mobile voice or data plans. There is also no eect on the bundling discount on the access price.
However, the entry in France has raised the unit price of mobile data by 4 dollars per Gigabyte ; contrary to the merger in Austria which signicantly reduces the unit price by 6 dollars per Gigabyte. These ndings are robust to changes in the counterfactual markets. They are driven by the bundling discount on the unit price of mobile data which is lower following the entry; but higher following the merger.
These results suggest that the dynamic eciency eects outweigh the static ones in the mobile telecommunications industry; more precisely between markets with three and four mobile network operators. They provide an empirical contribution to the literature on the eect of competition in a dynamic environment. As in Schmutzler (2013), much of this literature dealt with the impact of competition on investment.
In this paper, I go a step further by showing how a change in the market structure can aect prices through the channel of innovation.
The results of this paper also complement the ndings from the literature on bundling and nonlinear pricing as in Armstrong (2010) , by showing that the bundling discount on the unit price can fall following an increase in competition. The underlying rationale for this result is derived from the literature on the relationship between competition and investment which shows that investment in new technologies can fall following an increase in the number of rms (Vives, 2008) . They are also related to the literature on the impact of competition on nonlinear pricing as in Seim and Viard (2011) which found, contrary this paper, an increase of the quantity discount for high-valuation consumers after the deregulation of entry into the mobile telephony market in the US.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents some background information about the entry, the merger and the specic feature of the mobile tele-coms industry that could explain the ndings of this paper. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework which highlights the tradeo between the static and dynamic eects of increasing the number of rms in an innovative market. Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy, particularly the identication of the counterfactual markets for France and Austria, the dataset and the variables, the estimation of the hedonic pricing model and the formulation of the double-dierence estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the results along with some robustness checks and the underlying mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.
2 Industry Background
Innovation and Nonlinear Pricing in the Mobile Telecommunications Industry
The mobile telecommunications industry is characterized by signicant rate of technological progress. This features makes it particularly suitable to test the dynamic eciency eects. According to the study by (Koh and Magee, 2006) , the annual rate of technological progress in the transmission of information was 35 percent between 1940 and 2006. This is far greater than the annual rate of technological progress in energy transportation (13.2 percent) (Koh and Magee, 2008) . Every year, mobile communication equipment providers innovate and release new technologies of mobile telecommunications. The adoption of these new technologies by mobile operators reduces their marginal cost of production.
However, the tari proposed by rms in this industry is rather complex. Historically, mobile telecommunications services mainly consist of the supply of voice services, including short or multimedia messages services. These services can be purchased as prepaid or postpaid contract. Under a prepaid contract, the consumer typically pays for an allowance of voice before consuming. The set of prepaid contracts proposed by a rm is equivalent to a menu of pairs of quantity and tari, without any loyalty commitment required from the consumer. Under a postpaid contract, the consumer pays a tari periodically (monthly in general) for a given allowance, with a minimum duration of commitment for loyalty. Some postpaid plans include unlimited voice or data allowance. For mobile plans with limited allowance, the consumer should pay a unit price to use the service in excess of the initial allowance. Because of these features, the tari structure of a mobile plan is in general considered as a three-part tari (Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera, 2007 Following its entry, F ree oered two mobile plans with no handset subsidy (SIMOnly), one for 2 euros including 1 hour of voice calls, the other for 20 euros including unlimited voice calls and 3 Gigabytes of data. The 2 euros plan was then the cheapest in the market, leading to a substantial switching of consumers from the incumbent operators. Some weeks prior to the entry, the incumbent MNOs released comparable mobile plans but their prices remain slightly higher than the cheapest plan of F ree.
Three years later, the voice allowance of the 2 euros mobile plan rises by 1 hour and includes 50 Megabytes of data. The 20 euros plan remains with the same allowance although the subscriber can now have access to the fourth generation network. The new entrant also oers bundling discounts for its xed broadband customers.
In the Austrian market, Hutchison, the fourth operator in terms of market share, acquired Orange, the third operator, in December 2012 following a notication to the European Commission (EC) in May 2012. This notication underwent a thorough analysis by the EC, after which the clearing is made on the conditions that Hutchison divests its radio spectrum to a potential new entrant and provides wholesale access for mobile virtual network operators. In the aftermath of the merger, the newly formed operator Hutchison Drei Austria maintained the lowest tari previously proposed by Orange. Two years later, it removes this cheapest plan from its oers.
The gure below presents the evolution of the market concentration index in France and Austria. The HHI falls by 800 units within the three years following the entry of the fourth operator in France. This fall is rather signicant compared to the overall decline by 66 units over 6 years before the entry. In Austria, the merger has led to a jump of the HHI by 500 units. The theoretical model is drawn from the framework proposed by Saavedra (2011) where she uses a dierential game approach to analyze the impact of the number of rms in an industry with signicant technological progress. In this framework, n rms compete in price for the provision of a dierentiated product whose demand can be expressed as in Shubik and Levitan (1980) . The number of rms in the market is determined once and for all by a regulator. This is typically the case for the mobile telecommunications industry where network operators need to purchase a license from the regulator in order to supply their services.
The demand addressed to rm i writes:
Wherep is the standard average price in the market and γ is a parameter of product dierentiation.
Firms are symmetric with constant marginal cost of production c.
In a static framework, rms simultaneously set their prices to maximize their static prot π i = (p i − c)q i . The symmetric Nash equilibrium price and quantity write:
And
Where φ(n, γ) = n+γ(n−1) 2n+γ(n−1) characterizes the intensity of competition either through the degree of product dierentiation γ or the number of rms n. φ is actually an increasing function of its parameters.
In this static framework, the equilibrium price falls as the regulator increases the number of rms in the market. This is consistent with the standard static IO models.
In a dynamic framework, assume that rms simultaneously set their prices and investment to maximize their discounted net prot:
Where
is the instantaneous prot and y i (t) is the investment of rm i at time t.
The law of motion of the marginal cost is described by the following equation:
This equation implies that investment in new technology reduces the marginal cost of production due to the size of innovation represented by ρ and the investment eciency function ψ. This latter is positive, increasing and concave.
Given the settings of the model, it turns out that the open-loop Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect. In particular, the only steady state stable point is reached at the point where the investment is nil and the marginal cost is expressed as follows:
This steady state is reached under the condition that the size of innovation measured by ρ is large enough. This condition stems from the positivity of the expression under the radical.
The equilibrium price is the same as in the static game with the exception that the marginal cost now depends on the investment.
The eect of the number of rms on the equilibrium price writes:
It can be shown that the dynamic eciency eect ∂c * n ∂n is positive while the static eect − ∂φ ∂n 
Finding the best counterfactual markets for France and Austria
Given the observables determinants of entry or merger, I would implement a propensity score matching in order to determine the best counterfactual markets. However, within the set of 38 markets for which tari data is available, the entry of a new mobile operator occurs only in France and Israel in 2012; whereas the merger between two mobile network operator only happens in Austria in 2013. Therefore, there is not much variation in the "treatment" to implement a propensity score matching.
To overcome this limitation, I employ a principal component analysis (PCA) based on a set of variables that are deemed to determine the evolution of price in the market.
2 The PCA will transform these variables into an index that measures the distance between the potential counterfactual markets and France and Austria, respectively.
A best counterfactual market is a market where the prices of the mobile plans would have followed the same trend as in France or Austria, should an entry or merger occurs. We assume that the price trend is determined by demand factors such as the level and evolution of the mobile penetration, supply factors such as the number and the age of the MNOs, as well as by the level and evolution of the market structure 
The
Teligen database provides quarterly information about the characteristics of all the telecommunications plans proposed by the major operators in the OECD member
States including 6 non-OECD countries, making a total of 40 countries covered. It covers the two or three largest operators that made up at least 50% of the market size in terms of subscribers. As a result of this selection, information on the new entrants are generally not present in the database. The estimation will only be valid for the incumbent operators.
5 The Teligen database is compiled by Strategy-Analytics and the Wirless Intelligence database is compiled by the GSMA. These are proprietary data purchased by Orange Group. I am grateful to Orange for having provided access to these databases.
The Teligen database provides information about both xed and mobile telecommunications plans but the estimation will be done on the mobile telecommunications plans as the change in the market structure only occurs on the mobile market.
6 The information provided by the Teligen database allows distinguishing three types of mobile plans, namely postpaid, prepaid and pay-as-you-go. The pay-as-you-go plans do not provide any information about the voice or data allowance. They cannot be used in the estimation. Regarding the prepaid plans, they are not representative of the pricing and consumption of a given consumer as they can be purchased several times within a given period or consumed later after the purchase. In addition, they are always supplied in standalone. For these reasons, the estimation will rely on postpaid plans, as they provide information on the monthly price of voice and data in standalone or bundled.
On top of the price information and the bundling status of a mobile plan, the dataset also contains information about the monthly allowances, namely the number of minutes, the volume of data along with the download speed. Additional information on the characteristics of the mobile plan are the contract duration (in months), whether the plan is targeted to business or residential consumers and whether it is Gb for unlimited bundled plan. We check that our results are not sensitive to these choices.
7
6 The change in the market structure of the mobile market may also aect the pricing of the xed telecommunications plans. A robustness check that includes the xed telecommunications plans into the dataset nds no eect of the change in the mobile market structure on their pricing.
7 These sensitivity analyzes are available upon request.
Descriptive Statistics
The closeness between France and Korea as well as between Austria and Italy in terms of their mobile markets is conrmed by the following descriptive statistics.
First, as show in the gure 4, the rate of mobile penetration in Korea is similar to the one observed in France. The same conclusion stands out when comparing the mobile penetration rate between Austria and Italy. Before, the entry of Free Mobile, there were three MNOs in both France and Korea with similar dates of entry (gure 5). Likewise, there were four MNOs in both Austria and Italy and they enter in approximately the same years. The entry in France raises the number of MNOs from 3 to 4; whereas the merger in Austria reduces the number of MNOs from 4 to 3. This is an interesting feature for the policy debate about the number of MNOs that is the most likely to maximize social welfare. Meanwhile, the evaluation of the dynamic eciency eect will be only valid for a change in the market structure from 4 to 3 rms or inversely.
In addition, as shown in gures 6 and 7, the level and evolution of the HHI were alike in France and Korea, as well as in Austria and Italy before the change in the market structure. In all the markets, there is a general downward sloping trend in the HHI. However, the entry in France, has accelerated this trend; driving the HHI down from 3750 in Q4-2011 to 2940 in Q2-2014. In the meantime, the HHI merely falls from 3860 to 3800 in Korea. Regarding the merger in Austria, it signicantly raises the HHI from 3080 in Q4-2012 to 3560 in Q2-2014; while in the meantime, the HHI slightly falls from 3000 to 2870 in Italy.
Figure 8 presents the evolution of the average price of the mobile plans irrespective of whether they include voice or data, and whether they are provided in standalone or bundle. It shows that on average, the price of mobile plans is higher; but falling in
France, compared to Austria where it is lower; but rising. These price statistics do not account for the nonlinear structure of the tari, the bundling discounts, as well as the price attached to the add-ons services. The hedonic price model presented in the new section addresses this issue.
The Hedonic Price Model
I overcome the shortcomings of the descriptive statistics by estimating a hedonic price model following Griliches (1961) . The hedonic price model is based on the intuition that any product can be viewed as a bundle of attributes such that rms and consumers trade to determine the price attached to each attribute. Rosen (1974) provides a formal presentation of this model in a perfectly competitive framework and Karamti and Grzybowski (2010) applies it to study the evolution of the prices of mobile telephony services in France.
As discussed in the background section, the price of a mobile plan is typically a threepart tari. However, I assume for simplicity that the pair of tari and allowance that characterizes a mobile plan can be represented by a two-part tari. The xed part corresponds to the access charge and the variable part corresponds to the unit price. On top of these components, I also add a bundling discount for the taris of those plans that are proposed in bundles.
The design of the hedonic price model is meant to recover the access and unit prices of voice and data; as well as the corresponding bundling discounts. The access and unit prices have been identied under the hypothesis of a constant unit price.
Regarding the bundling discounts, their identication relies on the observation of the prices of the standalone products that made up the bundles. The hedonic price model writes:
Where T i is the monthly price of the mobile plan i, in constant 2013 US dollars PPP. D i is the download speed of plan i in Gigabits per second. D i = 0 for mobile voice plans so that the coecients λ v and λ d measure the access price to mobile voice and data respectively. B i is a dummy variable for bundle plans. It coecient δ measures the bundle discount on the access price. Its sign should be negative. SV i and BV i are respectively the number of hours of voice calls included in standalone and bundled plans. Their coecients α s and α b measure respectively the unit price of standalone voice and its bundling discount or premium. Similarly, SD i and BD i are respectively the number of Gigabytes of data included in standalone and bundled plans. Their corresponding coecients β s and β b measure respectively the unit price of standalone data and its and bundling discount or premium. X i includes the characteristics of the plans such as the duration of the contract in months, the market segment addressed (business or residential) and a dummy for SIM-only plans.
The hedonic price model also includes country, operator and quarter xed eects represented by the variable F e i . This equation is estimated by OLS correcting for arbitrary heteroscedasticity. The quality of the hedonic price model is evaluated by the goodness of t indicator, R-squared. The hedonic price model is generally deemed satisfactory when the R-squared is large enough, typically above 80%. 
Whereθ t denotes the estimator of the impact of entry/merger on the component θ of the price at the date t. This component may be the standalone access or unit price of voice or data, or their corresponding bundling discounts. T represents the tari of the mobile plan. M denotes a dummy variable for the market in which entry/merger occurs. Due to data limitation, the reference date t 0 is set to the rst quarter of 2013 for both entry and merger. This choice corresponds to the date of the merger in Austria. However, it is rather a later date with respect to the date of entry of Free in France (January 2012).
An OLS estimation of the hedonic price model with the interaction terms provides the estimates ofθ t . This estimation is made on each pair of markets: (France, Korea) for the entry, and (Austria, Italy) for the merger.
On top of the postpaid plans, the econometric model is also estimated on a sample which includes the prepaid plans; even though these latter typically do not reect the actual consumption of the consumers. Otherwise, the estimates on the postpaid plans may be biased if prepaid plans represent a signicant share of the consumers' purchase. This is the case in Italy where the revenue from prepaid plans represents more than half of the mobile market total revenue (Ovum, online database).
In order to reect the actual change in price borne by the consumers, I also ac- 
Where Y ij represents the allowance of voice (j=1) or data (j=2) in the plan i andȲ j is the average consumption of voice or data observed at the market level.
I assign to each plan a weight that is inversely proportional to its distance with respect to the average consumption of voice and data. The weight is computed for each operator at a given quarter as follow:
Then I implement a weighted least square estimation using the normalized weights, clustered at the operator and quarter level. The intuition behind this weighting is that the plans that are farther away from the average consumption pattern are given lower weight in the estimation of the impact of entry/merger.
Results

Main Estimation Results
Tables 5 to 14 in appendix presents the detailed results of the estimation of the impact of entry in France and merger in Austria on the access and unit prices of voice and data, as well as on the bundling discounts. The variable shock is a dummy for the country in which entry/merger occurs. packmob is a dummy for a bundle of mobile voice and data. The rst three columns present the result of the impact of a change in the market structure using respectively the monthly price of the postpaid plan, the consumption weights, and including the prepaid plans. This section comments the results of these columns. The remaining columns present the robustness check results using up to the fth closest markets to France and Austria.
The table 1 below presents a synthesis of the estimation results. Regarding the unit price of standalone mobile voice, it was higher in France than in Korea; but the corresponding bundling discount is larger in France. It is not aected by the entry, for it does not change signicant either in France or in Korea.
Its bundling discount is downward sloping; providing an evidence of a fall in the unit price of mobile voice in bundle in both markets. No specically signicant trend is observed for France, implying that even though the unit price of mobile voice package is falling in France, the same trend is observed in Korea as well. For this reason, the entry of the fourth mobile operator in France has no eect on the unit price of mobile voice in bundle.
For the standalone mobile data, the unit price in France was not statistically dierent from the one observed in the Korean market. However, this dierence turns out to be large and signicant when the sample is weighted, meaning that many mobile plans with greater unit price of data are closer to the average consumption of data in France or farther away from the average consumption in Korea. In terms of trend, there is no signicant change in the unit price of mobile data in Korea. However, the unweighted unit price of mobile data rises in France, suggesting that the entry raises the unit price of standalone mobile data. Yet, this impact is no longer signicant when the sample is weighted. Therefore the rise in the unit price mostly aects mobile data plans that are farther away from the average data consumption in
France. Put dierently, standalone mobile data plans become more expensive in
France following the entry but they are chosen by very few consumers.
The bundling discount on the unit price of mobile data was greater in France than in Korea; but this dierence is no longer signicant when we account for the consumption weights attached to each plan, which implies that the mobile plans with the larger discount are farther away from the average consumption of data in France.
There is no signicant change in the bundling discount on the unit price of mobile data in Korea. However, It turns out that this discount is falling in France irrespective of the specication. As a consequence, the entry in France has increased the unit price of mobile bundled plans, particularly because of the rise in the unit price of the included mobile data. The magnitude of this rise is about 4 dollars per Gigabyte of mobile data.
The impact of the acquisition of Orange Austria by Hutchison
The access to standalone mobile voice or data was more expensive in Austria than in Italy. They remain constant in both markets; meaning that the merger does not aect the access price of standalone mobile voice and data plans. Their bundling discounts were similar across the market and also remain constant over the quarters.
Therefore, the merger in Austria does not aect the discount on the access price of the mobile bundle.
With respect to the unit price of standalone mobile voice plan, it is not statistically dierent from the unit price observed in Austria. Moreover, it does not change either in Italy or in Austria; implying that the merger in Austria does not aect the unit price of standalone mobile voice plans. The only change is a rise in the unit price of prepaid mobile voice plans in Italy; but they are farther away from the average consumption of voice in this market such that the weighted sample estimation shows no signicant change in the unit price of standalone mobile voice. Similar results are obtained for the bundling discount on the unit price of mobile voice.
Regarding the standalone mobile data plans, they have the same unit price in Italy and Austria. However, the weighted average unit price is signicantly lower in Austria; suggesting that the cheaper standalone mobile data plans are closer to the average consumption in Austria. There is a rise in the unit price of standalone mobile data plans in both Austria and Italy. The unweighted regressions show no specic signicant change in the unit price in Austria. However, we nd a signicant rise in this unit price in the second quarter when the sample is weighted, though there is a falling trend afterward. As a result, the merger does not aect the unit price of standalone mobile data plans. The rising trend is common to Austria and its counterfactual market.
The bundling discount on the unit price of mobile data is not statistically dierent between Austria and Italy. Still, it turns out to be positive and very signicant when the consumption weights are applied. This result suggests that the bundle discount on the unit price of mobile data is lower for mobile bundle plans that are closer to the average consumption of data in Austria. The bundling discount is falling in both Austria and Italy. However, it falls less in Austria, and even turns out to be upward trending. Therefore, the merger in Austria has led to lower unit price of mobile data in bundle. The magnitude of this fall is about 6 dollars per Gigabyte of mobile data.
Robustness Checks
In this section, I check the robustness of the main estimation results with respect to two features of the estimation strategy: the choice of the counterfactual markets and the underlying parallel trend assumption of the double-dierence identication strategy.
The choice of the counterfactual markets
The last three columns of tables 5 to 14 provide the point estimates of the impact of a change in the market structure using the next best counterfactual markets. Testing the parallel trend assumption
The identication of the double-dierence strategy relies on the assumption that the price trend is similar between the treated market (the one in which entry or merger occurs) and its counterfactual before the change in the market structure.
This assumption could not be tested directly in the main estimation as the Teligen tari dataset does not provide the relevant price information before the change in the market structure. The most relevant information is available from the rst quarter of 2013. However, the broadband internet access cost dataset (BIAC) constructed by the European Commission can be used as an alternative for this test. The test basically compares the evolution of the prices of mobile voice and data services between each treated market and its counterfactual before the change in the market structure. As mobile telecommunications services are bundled with xed broadband, their prices have been derived from a hedonic price model using the following equation:
Where T is the monthly tari of the xed broadband plan, F V is a dummy variable when xed voice service is included, M V is a dummy variable when mobile voice is included, M BB is a dummy variable when mobile broadband is included, M is a dummy variable for the market which experience a change in its market structure (France or Austria) and X is a set of characteristics of the xed broadband plans including the download speed, the technology used and whether xed voice is required for the purchase of the xed broadband plan. This equation is estimated on each pair of markets (France, Korea) and (Austria, Italy) for each year. The coecient δ captures the price dierence between the treated market and its counterfactual.
The OLS estimation of this equation yields the tari structure of the xed broadband and particularly the hedonic price of mobile voice and data in each market for each year. The results are presented in the table 15 in appendix. They show that the average price dierence between the two markets is not signicant in all of the regressions. However, there is some dierence between the coecients of the components of the xed broadband plan.
The parallel trend assumption is equivalent to testing whether these coecients are statistically equal across the years 2011 and 2012. More specically, it consists in comparing the point estimates of each pair of markets across the two years. We implement a test using the seemingly unrelated estimation method (Zellner, 1962) .
The p-values associated with these tests are shown at the bottom of the table 15 in appendix. They imply that the coecients are not statistically dierent across the years. Therefore, there is some evidence of a parallel price trend between the treated markets and their counterfactuals.
Conclusion
This paper provides an empirical evidence about the dynamic eciencies eects in the mobile telecommunications markets. It does so by estimating the impact of the entry of the fourth mobile operator in France and the merger between the third and fourth operators in Austria on the price of mobile telecommunications services. It nds that the entry of the fourth mobile operator in the French market has raised the unit price of mobile data plans by 4 dollars per Gigabyte; contrary to the merger from three to four operators in Austria which reduces the unit price by 6 dollars per Gigabyte.
These results are driven by the bundling discount on the unit price of mobile data which falls following the entry; but rises following the merger. They are consistent with the ndings by Vives (2008) whereby an increase in the number of rms can reduce rm's investment in process innovation. Actually, mobile operators oers more bundles of voice and data following the change in the market structure. However, they come with lower download speed and data allowance following the entry, and with higher speed and data allowance in the aftermath of the merger.
Besides, there is indeed a fall in the unit price of mobile voice calls following the entry of Free in the french market, due to the development of unlimited mobile voice plans. However, this eect could not be ascribed to the entry, for a decrease of comparable magnitude is also observed in its counterfactual market, Korea. Furthermore, several surveys highlight the fall in the consumers' expenditures in mobile telecommunications following the entry of Free in France. The result of this paper suggest that this fall is mainly due to the development of SIM-only plans, which the hedonic pricing model nets out as an add-on component, dierent from the price of the actual communications services.
Overall, the results of this paper show that the dynamic eciency eects outweigh the static ones in the mobile telecommunications industry, at least when merging from four to three rms. They suggest that the investment in new technologies is a mean to increase the allowance of a mobile plan without changing its tari. As in (Jeanjean, forthcoming) , this is the force driving down the unit price of mobile data services. In addition, this paper highlights the importance of taking into account the nonlinear price structure and the adds-on services when assessing the price of mobile telecommunications services. This is because a change in the market structure aects allowances as well as the included adds-on services such as the mobile devices and the length of the contractual commitment. The PCA yields 7 factors using the seven determinants of the price trend. 
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Hedonic regression of the monthly subscription price on the characteristics of the mobile plans in Austria. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*). Robust Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*). Robust Standard errors in parentheses. P-value=0.82 Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*). Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
